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Abstract 
 
We propose an ob jective for the firm in a general model of production economies extending over 
time under uncertainty and with incomplete markets. Trading in commodities and shares of stock 
occurs sequentially on spot markets at all date-events. We derive the objective of the firm from the 
assumption of initial-shareholders efficiency. Each shareholder is assumed to communicate to the 
firm her marginal valuation of profits at all date events (expressed in terms of initial resources). In 
defining her own marginal valuation of the firm’s profits, a shareholder will take two elements into 
consideration. To evaluate the direct impact of a change in dividends the shareholder uses her own 
vector of marginal rates of substitution for revenue across date-events. In addition, the shareholder 
will take into account the impact of future dividends on the firm’s stock price when she trades shares. 
To predict the effect on the stock price, she uses a (possibly different) state price process, her price 
theory. The only restriction that we impose on consumers’ price theories is that they should be 
compatible with the observed equilibrium: given the equilibrium prices and production plans, a price 
theory must satisfy a no-arbitrage condition. The firm computes its own shadow prices for profits at 
all date-events by simply adding up the marginal valuations of all its initial shareholders. We prove 
existence of an equilibrium. 
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1This paper consists of: (i) an extensive non-technical introduction, re-
viewing the problem and the previous literature (sections 1.1 to 1.4) and
summarising our contribution (1.5 and 1.6); (ii) a compact technical de-
scritption of our model (section 2) and a statement of our main result (sec-
tion 3); (iii) the proof of our main result (section 4); (iv) an Appendix col-
lecting the proofs of ancillary lemma’s. Sections 1 and 2−3 are self-contained
and can be read independently. However, the logic behind sections 2− 3 is
explained with more detail in section 1.5, to which readers are referred back
in section 2.
1 Subject-matter and overview
1.1 General equilibrium and incomplete markets
The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the positive theory of general
equilibrium in production economies extending over time under uncertainty
and with incomplete markets.
The standard model fitting these specifications is known as GEI: general
equilibrium with incomplete markets; see, e.g. Geanakoplos (1990) or Mag-
ill and Shafer (1991) for surveys. The basic specification rests on that in
Chapter 7 of Debreu (1959). The economy consists of two kinds of agents:
consumers and firms. Time and uncertainty are captured by an event tree
that specifies, for each date up to a finite horizon, the set of possible date-
events reflecting the (common) information of the agents at that date. There
are L physical commodities at each date-event. With N date-events over
the tree, the commodity space is the NL-dimensional Euclidean space. Each
consumer h is defined by its consumption set in that space, by its initial en-
dowment of commodities in the same space, and by its preferences among
NL-dimensional consumption vectors. Each firm j is defined by its produc-
tion set in the same space. In addition, all firms are initially owned by the
consumers.
In Debreu’s model, there exist markets at date 0 for trading all com-
modities (that is, for trading claims to each physical commodity contingent
on each date-event). The resulting model is formally analogous to that of a
production economy extending over a single period: consumers face a single
budget constraint, over which they maximise preferences; firms maximise
the present value of profits at market prices. Under this complete market
system, trading in shares of ownership is redundant: each firm is analogously
defined by a vector of event-dependent profits, with present value equal to
the firm’s market value. Trading in contingent commodities is a perfect
2substitute for trading in shares of the firms. Uncertainty makes no differ-
ence, due to the perfect insurance opportunities provided by the complete
markets.
An alternative interpretation of the same model had appeared earlier in
a seminal paper by Arrow (1953). Restrict trade in commodities to spot
markets at each date event, and add markets at each date-event for elemen-
tary securities, each paying off in a specific successor date-event. The set of
attainable allocations is the same as in Debreu.
The assumption of complete markets has long been recognised as un-
realistic. In the real world, not all contingencies are amenable to perfect
insurance. In the words of Magill and Quinzii (1996, p.4): “. . . the ideal
structure of markets in which everything is traded out in advance would
involve prohibitively large transactions costs”. What we encounter in prac-
tice is a sequence of spot markets on which commodities are exchanged (as
with Arrow), together with a limited set of asset markets through which
limited reallocation of resources over time and across date-events is possible
(at variance with Arrow). The resulting model is labelled GEI. Compared
with the complete-markets model, two new features emerge: (i) consumers
are faced with multiple budget constraints; and (ii) firms are not able to
evaluate production plans in terms of market values.
A complete specification of the GEI model calls for defining the set of
tradable assets. Ideally, one would like to see that set emerge endogenously
from primitive considerations on transactions costs. In the words of Magill
and Quinzii (1996): “only those contracts can survive for which the benefits
from exchange outweigh the costs involved in their enforcement”1. Although
there exists some investigation of that principle (e.g. Bisin 1998), most of
the work on GEI (starting with the seminal paper by Radner 1972) includes
the definition of tradable assets among the primitives of the model. Two
notable specifications have been studied: (i) in models of exchange, a given
set of assets paying off in units of account is given exogenously; (ii) in
models of production, the basic assets are the shares of the firms – sometimes
completed by default-free bonds.
In this introductory section, we refer successively to exchange economies,
then to production economies extending over two periods, then finally to
production economies extending over multiple periods.
1As an interesting illustration, Miller (1991, p. 18) attributes the short-lived fate of
the Chicago market for CPI contracts (which he labels ”the economist’s dream contract”)
to ”insufficient demand for immediacy” (i.e. for ”speedy execution of trades”) - meaning
”insufficient” to cover the fixed cost of that market.
31.2 Plans, prices and price expectations
For an exchange economy extending over time under uncertainty, with an in-
complete market structure exogenously given, the analysis of Radner (1972)
yields existence of an equilibrium. The basic premise is that, although spot
markets for commodities and assets open sequentially, all the agents hold
common, correct, point expectations about market clearing prices. The equi-
librium is defined by the property that, at the prices prevailing at time 0 and
at the associated expectations for prices on spot markets at later date-events,
the quantities demanded and supplied by the utility-maximising consumers
(faced with multiple budget constraints) clear all markets.
The crucial assumption about price expectations is often labelled perfect
foresight. It is of course a very strong assumption, in the absence of any
mechanism apt to coordinate consumer expectations. That is also the reason
why an alternative approach has been developed under the name TGE:
temporary general equilibrium. Under that approach, it is not assumed
that expectations about future prices are common, or correct, or single-
valued. Only that consumer expectations are continuously related to market
observations at 0, and have overlapping ranges across agents. We come back
to TGE at the end of this section. Suffice it to mention here that it has been
criticised by GEI theorists as placing insufficient constraints on the consumer
price expectations; see, e.g. Dre`ze (1999 sect. 4). Thus, GEI and TGE are
polar cases regarding expectations.
For the GEI exchange economy, it is easy to define the set of allocations
that are feasible: namely, the allocations such that consumer consumptions
are compatible (they add up to aggregate initial endowments), and sus-
ceptible of being attained through trade of the existing assets. In other
words, feasibility recognises the limits to transfers of resources across date-
events (the limits to insurance opportunities) inherent in the incomplete
asset structure. On that basis, one can define the concept of Constrained
Pareto Optimality2 (CPO): an allocation is constrained Pareto optimal if
and only if it is feasible, and there does not exist another feasible allocation
that Pareto-dominates it. It is shown in Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis
(1986) that, generically in initial endowments and utility functions, equilib-
ria as defined above are not CPO.
2First introduced in Diamond (1967).
41.3 Investment under private ownership: the two period case
The standard model of a two-period production economy raises the new
issue of defining the decision criteria of the firms. Production plans have a
time 0 component, and N − 1 time 1 components (one per terminal date-
event). There is a stock market open a time 0, where shares of the firms
are traded. A shareholder at time 0 after stock-market clearing receives
a dividend equal to the value of the time 0 component of the production
plan; in case of net investment by the firm, that dividend is negative (it
operates like an addition to the stock price)3 . At time 1, the value of the
production plan at a date-event accrues to the time 0 shareholders as a
dividend (assumed non-negative under limited liability). The stock market
does not reopen (it would be redundant)4. Consumers know the production
plans of all firms when choosing their portfolios; and the stock market at
time 0 clears through prices.
The new difficulty is that, under genuinely incomplete markets, the prof-
its at time 1 under date-event ξ (ξ = 1, .., N − 1) do not have a well-defined
market value at time 0, when production plans are chosen. Indeed, with J
firms, J < N − 1, only the J vectors of date 1 profits (namely (N − 1) -
vectors) are priced by the market. Maximising the present value of profits
(through choice of the production plan) is not well defined. Thus, one needs
to specify a decision criterion for the firm. And the assumption of common,
correct point expectations applies only to commodity prices at time 1 date-
events. It does not apply to present values ( at date 0) of event-specific
profits, since there are no market prices for these.
The concept of Constrained Pareto Optimality is still well defined, for
this model. An allocation is constrained feasible if and only if it is phys-
ically feasible, and susceptible of being attained through asset trading at
given production plans. For normative purposes, it is easy to formulate
the necessary first-order conditions (FOC) on production plans required by
CPO. To that end, remember that each consumer optimises its consumption
subject to N distinct budget constraints. Denote by λ the N -vector of La-
grange multipliers associated with these constraints, and by λ¯ the N -vector
of ratios λξλ0 . These define marginal rates of substitution between “income”
at date 1 in date-event ξ and income at date 0. (Under the assumption of
perfect foresight, these marginal rates of substitution are defined at com-
3That is, firms do not engage in financial transactions of their own, a straightforward
application of the Modigliani-Miller theorem.
4Indeed, the value of a firm would be equal to its dividends, and there would be no
incentives to trade shares
5mon market-clearing spot prices for commodities at all date-events.) Con-
sider a firm owned by a single consumer h, deciding simultaneously about
its consumption and about the production plan of its firm. Then, jointly
optimal consumption and production plans would entail that firm profits
are maximal (over the production set) at the shadow prices λ¯h. For a gen-
eral case in which the firm may have multiple shareholders, it is shown in
Dre`ze (1974) that necessary FOC for CPO impose that profits of each firm
should be maximal at shadow prices defined as weighted averages of the
marginal rates of substitution of the firm’s shareholders, with weights given
by respective shareholdings. That is also a necessary FOC condition for
Pareto efficiency of the production plan from the viewpoint of that firm’s
final shareholders. Pending that condition, there would exist changes in
production and zero-sum transfers among shareholders making all of them
better off. That result is an important clarification of the normative issues
raised by market incompleteness in a production economy: it defines un-
ambiguously a desirable decision criterion for the firms, in a general model
under standard assumptions. (It is often referred-to in the literature as “the
Dre`ze criterion”.)
Dre`ze (1974) also brings out the important feature that, under incom-
plete markets, the set of feasible allocations is not convex. Indeed, the divi-
dends received by a shareholder, which enter as parameters of their budget
constraints, are defined as a product of two endogenous variables, namely the
shareholding and the firm profits. This bilinearity results in a non-convex
feasible set for the economy, the very set over which CPO is defined. Thus,
necessary FOC are in general not sufficient. If equilibria are defined by the
Dre`ze criterion, equilibria exist, but they need not be CPO5. It is shown in
Geanakoplos et al. (1990) that, generically in initial endowments, they are
not CPO.
The relevance of this analysis for positive economics is open to de-
bate. The notion of shareholder (Pareto) efficiency of production decisions is
clearly appealing for privately owned firms or small partnerships. For large
corporations listed on stock exchanges, the appeal is much less compelling:
shareholder preferences (their λ¯’s) have no natural channel of expression;
the role of shareholders is limited to approval voting at general assemblies.
It would take a lot of faith in the Coase theorem to claim realism for the
Dre`ze criterion. However, an important step in the direction of realism is
provided by later work of Dre`ze (1985, 1989 chapters 2 and 3)) on “equilibria
5Examples appear in Dre`ze (1974, section 4) - also for the nested case of complete
markets.
6of production and exchange”, then “equilibria of production, exchange and
labour contracts”. The new ingredient is the so-called control principle: for
each firm j, given shareholdings θhj , there exists a uniquely (endogenously)
defined subset of shareholders, say the Board of Directors; decisions about
production plans must be endorsed by a majority of shareholders including
all the directors. Thus, directors are veto players, a feature that also circum-
vents the Condorcet paradox of voting. And it is reasonable to assume that
production decisions will be Pareto efficient for the small set of directors
(subject to majority approval by all shareholders). Since the set of direc-
tors is endogenous (related to shareholdings), the general specification has
undeniable realism. The only special assumption is that the correspondence
defining the set of directors (as a function of shareholdings) is upper hemi-
continuous for the discrete topology (see appendix 2 of Dre`ze 1989)6. An
interesting by-product of this extension is that it covers as a special case del-
egation of the production decisions to a manager, as in Radner (1972), with
the mild requirement that the manager be also a shareholder. (That mild
requirement is also satisfied if the manager receives a profit share.) Indeed, a
predetermined shareholder-manager is a particular, upper hemi-continuous
(constant) selection of directors.
1.4 Stochastic production economies: the T -period case
The additional difficulties arising in T -period production economies are sub-
stantial, and the state of the literature on that topic is much less advanced
(which provides the motivation for the present paper). In the two-period
model, the stock market is operative only at period 0; stock prices are thus
known to all agents when they finalise consumption, portfolio or produc-
tion decisions. With more than two periods, the stock market reopens at
all future (non-terminal) date-events. Perfect foresight may be invoked for
future stock prices. But future stock market transactions will modify the
shareholdings of the firms. If production plans are subject to revisions, these
will be decided by shareholders at the time of revisions. The identity as well
as preferences of these future shareholders are not observable at the initial
date. Accordingly, the future revisions of the initial production decisions are
difficult to fathom. Perfect foresight does not apply to these future revisions,
and it would stretch the imagination to postulate that it does.
A further difficulty comes from conflicts of interest among initial share-
6Examples of acceptable specifications include: all shareholders holding at least α% of
the shares, the n biggest shareholders, the leading shareholders owning at least β% of the
shares.
7holders with divergent portfolio plans. If consumer h plans selling shares
of firm j at a future date-event ξ, then h will benefit from a high market
price for j at ξ (say qjξ). If consumer h
′ plans buying additional shares at ξ,
then h′ will benefit from a low market price for j at ξ. When assessing the
desirability of alternative production plans, shareholders like h or h′ will be
concerned about the impact of profits at distant date-events on the market
price at ξ; this raises a new issue in forcasting: not only future prices matter,
but also “derivatives” of such market prices with respect to future profits.
The specification of the model, and significantly the definition of a decision
criterion for the firm, have to cope with these new complications. It is thus
not surprising that the relevant theory is still in infancy. We know of only
two significant contributions, one normative and one positive.
To start with the normative side, there is an extremely useful recent
contribution by Bonnisseau and Lachiri ((2002), BL from now on). They
consider a production economy extending over T periods, with a single phys-
ical commodity (L = 1), and with shares of the firms as the only assets. At
each non-terminal date-event, shares of the firms are traded on the stock
market. BL rely on a permissive concept of Constrained Pareto Optimality.
An allocation is defined by consumptions xh, portfolios θh and production
plans yj . An allocation (x, θ, y) is constrained feasible if and only if: (i) it is
physically feasible (consumption = endowments + production,
∑
h θ
hj
ξ = 1
at each ξ); (ii) it is financially decentralisable, i.e. there exist stock prices q
such that the budget constraints of consumers are satisfied at each ξ, given
their x’s, their θ’s and these prices. An allocation is constrained Pareto opti-
mal if (i) and (ii) hold and there does not exist another constrained feasible
allocation that Pareto-dominates it. This is a “permissive” concept of CPO,
because it does not impose any constraints on the stock prices, not even the
standard mild requirement of “no arbitrage”. (See also the example at the
end of section 3 in BL.)
Under that definition, BL are able to provide necessary FOC for CPO:
the profits of all firms should be maximal at shadow prices obtained as
weighted sums of the marginal rates of substitution (our λ¯’s) of shareholders,
with the weights at each date-event corresponding to shareholdings at that
date-event. This is a natural extension to multiple periods of the Dre`ze
criterion. But it is much more demanding here than in the two-period model:
the identity, shareholdings and preferences of all future shareholders of a firm
must be known! The BL result, in its simplicity, is thus extremely instructive
from a normative viewpoint, but it is definitely unrealistic from a positive
viewpoint. Indeed, the informational requirement is simply prohibitive.
8Turning to the positive side, we are taken back to the seminal paper by
Grossman-Hart ((1979), GH). These authors were the first to identify the
specific difficulties associated with extending the horizon from 2 to T periods.
They deal with a general production economy extending over T periods with
L commodities. The only assets are shares of the firms, traded on the stock
market at each non-terminal date-event. Three special assumptions are
added, each of which requires interpretation.
(GH1): competitive price perceptions; we discuss that assumption ex-
tensively below;
(GH2): no revisions of production plans; that assumption stipulates
that a production plan yj is chosen once and for all at date 0 by share-
holders before the stock market opens; that is, by the consumers inheriting
positive shareholdings from the past, as part of the primitives; this is an as-
sumption about the sequence of decisions (production plans first, trading of
shares thereafter); it is in the nature of a technological assumption, clearly
introduced for simplicity and clarity: there is no concern about potential re-
visions of the production plans by future shareholders, since these are ruled
out by the technology;
(GH3): possibility of closure; at each date event ξ, irrespective of the
production plan implemented through the predecessors of ξ, 0 belongs to
the production set over the subtree starting with ξ; this may be interpreted
as an extreme form of limited liability: a firm may close down and disappear
at any point, reneging on any obligations it might have incurred previously;
actually, the assumption is less severe than it looks; it amounts to stat-
ing that the production set of firm j allows for the possibility of inaction
from ξ onward, without consequences for the feasibility of plans before ξ; at
equilibrium, there will be no unmet obligations after closing down.
Assumption (GH1) deserves clarification. It bears on the perceptions
by consumers of the impact of additional profits at some date-event ξ′ on the
market values of the firm at earlier date-events, say ξ. Let us represent these
perceptions by a “state price process”, to be denoted αh for consumer h and
called “h’s price theory”. What does it mean to entertain “competitive price
perceptions”? Magill and Quinzii (1996, p.382) mention two properties:
- “the price of a bundle of goods is the sum of the prices of its components;
- the unit price of each component is independent of the number of units
of the good purchased or sold.”
Applied to the pricing of firms on the stock market, these principles
imply that the state price process αh must satisfy, for all j’s and ξ:
9αξq
j
ξ =
∑
ξ′≥ξ
αξ′pξ′ · yjξ′ for all ξ ∈ ∪T−1t=0 Ξt with, for any ξ ∈ ΞT , qjξ = 0,
(1.1)
where qjξ is the market price of j at ξ and pξ′y
j
ξ′ are the profits of j
at ξ′. Indeed, shares at ξ are the “bundle of goods” defined by vectors of
future profits. Provided the αh’s are independent of j’s profits, this formula
satisfies the two desired properties. If all the αhξ are strictly positive it also
implies that the stock prices are arbitrage-free. This will be our definition
of competitive price perceptions – neither more nor less7.
Assumption (GH1) in GH satisfies this definition, but goes far beyond:
these authors assume that h’s price theory is given by h’s own marginal
rates of substitution λ¯h. A trivial application reveals the shortcomings of
that restrictive specification. If h is a consumer expecting to die (from a
terminal illness) before ξ leaving no heirs behind, λhξ′ could be zero. It would
be preposterous for h to assume on that ground that additional profits at
ξ′ > ξ will not be valued by the market at ξ! Accordingly, we do not follow
GH on that path (the justification by MQ on p.386 notwithstanding). It is
unfortunate that two distinct assumptions, namely “competitive price per-
ceptions”, which is fine, and “price perceptions reflecting own consumption
preferences” (“egocentric price perceptions”?) have been lumped - initially
by GH, but subsequently by the whole literature - under a single heading.
As explained below (see equation (2.8)), “egocentric price perceptions” have
the momentous implication of cancelling from the shareholders’ evaluations
of production plans all the terms involving future portfolio transactions.
1.5 Price theories and equilibrium
We are now (at long last!) ready to introduce the contribution of this pa-
per to the positive theory of equilibria in production economies extending
over T periods under uncertainty and incomplete markets. We propose an
equilibrium concept based on initial-shareholders efficiency8, for a general
model of a real economy with L commodities and with assets consisting ex-
clusively of shares of stock. (The introduction of other assets, in particular
7In models (like ours) where short sales of shares are not allowed, the equalities in
(1.1) are validated by the existence of some agent holding positive shares in all firms.
The CAPM provides a theoretical example, “universal” funds of funds provide a realistic
example.
8Thus paving the way for the more ambitious formulation in terms of efficiency for an
endogenous board of directors, as in Dre`ze (1985, 1989).
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bonds, should not be problematic.) Trading in commodities and shares of
stock occurs sequentially on spot markets at all date-events. We retain the
assumption of perfect foresight, that is common, correct (at equilibrium),
single-valued price expectations. Importantly, we do not introduce any in-
formation about quantities traded. Our technological assumptions do not
rule out future revisions of the production plans (as ownership of the firms
evolves through share-trading). But we assume non-strategic behaviour with
respect to revisions of the production plans – an assumption of bounded ra-
tionality9. We endow each household h with a price theory αh satisfying
competitive price perceptions as defined by (1.1) above. And we define the
decision criteria of firms by the principle of initial shareholders efficiency, as
presently to be defined.
The idea of initial shareholders efficiency is straightforward: the pro-
duction plan chosen by firm j at date zero is such that there do not exist
an alternative production plan and transfers of initial resources among the
shareholders making all of them better off. This principle leads at once
to the property that the value of the chosen production plan is maximal at
shadow prices reflecting the marginal valuations of the shareholders (Lemma
2.2).
Each shareholder is assumed to communicate to firm j its marginal val-
uation of profits at all date events (a valuation expressed in terms of initial
resources). Profits at ξ are distributed to final shareholders at ξ (i.e. after
the stock market at ξ clears).In defining its own marginal valuation of firm
j’s profits, a shareholder h will take two elements into consideration:
- profits (dividends) at date-event ξ are first valued at h’s shadow price
(λ¯hξ ) for resources at ξ, multiplied by the shareholding of j by h at ξ, θ
jh
ξ ;
- next, h takes into account the impact of profits at ξ on the market
value of j at every node ξ′ < ξ where h is trading j’s shares; this impact
is assessed according to h’s price theory, and applied to the volume of h’s
trade at ξ′ – thus with a positive sign in case of a sale, and a negative sign
in case of a purchase; the resulting impact is multiplied by h’s shadow price
for resources at ξ′, the date-event where the trade occurs10.
The sum of the terms in the second evaluation is added to the term in
the first evaluation, and this sum defines h’s marginal valuation of firm j’s
9Throughout, we ignore strategic behavior - like acquisition of shares aimed at influ-
encing production decisions.
10This formulation does not take into account a possible impact of investment (negative
profits) at node ξ on the market value of jat later nodes ξ′ > ξ. The reason is that
investments have no “value” of their own, beyond the profits which they generate later
on; and these profits are duly taken into account under our formulation.
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profits at date-event ξ; call this sum βhjξ .
Note that these calculations rely on the consumption and portfolio plans
of h. By themselves the shadow prices for resources λ¯h (the only ingredient
of the BL FOC) do not convey the relevant information, if not combined
with the planned portfolio trading plans and the consumer price theories.
Now, firm j computes its own shadow prices for profits at all date-events,
βj , by simply adding up the marginal valuations of all its initial shareholders.
There is no weighting involved, because shareholdings have been taken into
account by the shareholders themselves in computing their own marginal
valuations (see eq. (2.7) for the formal expression).
An equilibrium is a feasible allocation (x, θ, y) and prices (p for com-
modities, q for shares) such that all markets clear and all agents optimise:
(xh, θh) is best for h’s preferences subject to h’s budget constraints; yj has
maximal present value at the shadow prices βj .
This equilibrium concept borrows from GEI the perfect foresight assump-
tion; but it is in TGE spirit because: (i) future revisions of production plans
are ignored; and (ii) price perceptions are allowed to be idiosyncratic. It is,
of course, a sophisticated concept through the treatment of initial sharehold-
ers’ efficiency. We regard it as a first step, calling for the same extension
that Dre`ze (1989) adds to Dre`ze (1974) , namely boards of directors, . . .
But this first step is the natural stepping stone towards the more realistic
extension.
Our main result, Theorem ??, demonstrates the existence of an equi-
librium under standard assumptions (about preferences, endowments, pro-
duction sets, . . . ). That is, the Grossman-Hart theorem is here extended to
more general price perceptions (competitive, but not “egocentric”)11.
1.6 Extensions
The reason for basing here the production decisions of the firms on the
marginal valuations of initial shareholders rather then node 0 final share-
holders is technical: the shadow prices of firm j are not continuous when
some θhj goes to zero. At any positive value of θhj , h’s marginal valuations
of j’s profits enter the calculation of βj ; that marginal valuation includes a
“trading” component that is not proportional to θhj and remains finite when
11As an informative side-comment, the proof uses a detour to cope with excess supply of
shares at a zero price. That case has been problematic ever since Radner’s (1972) seminal
paper. It is handled here by verifying that, in such a case, rescaling production downward
keeps it on the efficient boundary of the production set.
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θhj goes to zero12. Hence, there is a discontinuity of βj at θhjξ0 = 0. When β
j
is calculated on the basis of initial shareholdings, as given by the primitives,
this potential discontinuity is immaterial: the set of relevant θ’s is fixed, and
only positive theta’s matter. If instead βj were calculated from after-trade
shareholdings, there is a discontinuity of βj when some θhjξ0 goes through
zero. Hence the option, in this paper, to retain the simpler specification:
initial shareholders.
A realistic formulation of the sequence of production decisions and share
trading would recognise that stock markets operate more or less continuously
(daily). New information about the state of the economy also arrives more
or less continuously. In contrast, production decisions are revised at discrete
intervals, for instance when shareholders meet. The formulation in GH and
here assumes that the economy “starts” at a point in time where a meeting
of shareholders is held13.
In closing this introduction, it is appropriate to mention one final issue
raised by the calculation of βj as a sum of shareholder marginal valuations,
namely truthful revelation of these valuations. A shareholder inflating sys-
tematically her marginal valuations (or some of them) would thereby in-
crease her influence on production decisions in the firm. But the increased
influence comes in at the cost of a distortion: because the marginal valua-
tions are expressed in terms of current resources, inflating them entails an
implicit discount rate lower than desired by the shareholder. This distortion
is already present in the two-period model. The revelation issue is the same
as in a pure public good problem: for shareholders, the production plans
are comparable to public goods (with exclusion). That issue is discussed in
Dre`ze (1974, section 6.2). Ignoring the issue is congruent with our general
assumption of non-strategic behaviour. But the issue still belongs on the
research agenda.
12Indeed, the dividend part of βhjξ is proportional to θ
hj
ξ and the trading part of β
hj
ξ is
a sum of terms at ξ′ < ξ proportional to trade there; neither θhjξ nor trades ta ξ
′ need go
to zero with θhjξ0 .
13In other words, we model the economy at a point in time when the stock market
is closed and firms choose production plans. The alternative of modeling the economy
after production plans have been chosen is uninteresting. The more ambitious program of
modeling the joint determination of production plans and stock-market equilibrium, as in
Dre`ze (1972, 1974 section 5), deserves thoughtful consideration.
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2 The Economy
We study a private ownership economy, populated by consumers and pri-
vately owned firms in finite numbers, that we index H = {1, . . . , h, . . . ,H}
and J = {1, . . . , j, . . . , J} respectively.
The economy evolves over a discrete and finite number of time periods.
Indexing today t = 0 and the future from tomorrow to the final day t =
1, . . . , T , we can describe aggregate uncertainty by an event tree. Let the
set of date-events be Ξ = ∪Tt=0Ξt. We write Ξt for the set of the events that
may occur at day t for t = 0, . . . , T and define Ξ− = Ξ\ΞT and Ξ+ = Ξ\Ξ0.
The root of the tree is denoted ξ0 = Ξ0, the unique state at time 0. For
each date-event ξ ∈ Ξ other than those belonging to ΞT , ξ+ represents the
set of the date-events that immediately succeed date-event ξ and Ξ+[ξ] the
sub-tree having ξ as the root. For a given ξ ∈ Ξ other than the root state
ξ0, we write ξ′ < ξ to mean all date-events ξ′ that belong to the backward
walk along the path from ξ to ξ0, ξ excluded, and ξ− to mean the unique
immediate predecessor of ξ.
There are L physical commodities (` = 1, 2, . . . , L) available for con-
sumption and production at each date-event. The commodity space across
the event tree can be written as RLΞ+ . We write xh = (xhξ )ξ∈Ξ ∈ RLΞ+ for the
bundle of commodities consumed by consumer h and yj = (yjξ)ξ∈Ξ ∈ RLΞ
for the production plan of firm j. Commodities are traded only on spot
markets at prices p = (pξ)ξ∈Ξ ∈ RLξ+ , where pξ ∈ RL+ represents spot prices
at date-event ξ.
There are J security markets where ownership shares of the J firms are
traded sequentially between consumers, in every date-event other than the
terminal ones, at the stock prices q = (. . . qjξ , . . .), with q
j
ξ the price of stock
j at date-event ξ. We write θh = (θhξ )ξ∈Ξ for the sequence of portfolios of
shares, with θhξ ∈ Rj+ the portfolio of shares held by consumer h at ξ ∈ Ξ.
2.1 Consumers
Each consumer h ∈ H is described by a real-valued intertemporal utility
function uh, defined on the set of possible consumption bundles Xh := RLΞ+ ,
and by an initial endowment (wh, θh
ξ−0
) := ((whξ )ξ∈Ξ; (θ
hj
ξ−0
)j∈J) ∈ RLΞ+ × RJ+
of commodities across date-events and of shares at ξ−0 .
In any date-event ξ ∈ Ξ other than the terminal ones, a consumer h
may buy a portfolio of ownership shares θhξ ≥ 0, at the competitive stock
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prices qξ. Consumer h holding the portfolio of shares θhξ at date-event ξ,
has an obligation to invest, or the right to receive dividends, in the amount∑
j∈J θ
hj
ξ (pξ · yjξ). That is, dividends at each node accrue to the new (after
trade) shareholders. In addition to the exchange on the stock markets, a
consumer h has to select a bundle of commodities xh ∈ RLΞ+ for consumption
at the cost of pξ · xhξ in each state ξ ∈ Ξ.
Consumers are constrained in their choices on consumption and shares by
their state-dependent budget constraints. At each date-event, the expense
to purchase consumption and ownership shares should not exceed incomes
from net dividends and from sales of commodities and shares.
Consumer h takes spot prices p, stock prices q and production plans
y as given, and chooses a consumption plan x˜h and a portfolio of shares
θ˜h which maximize her utility over the budget set Bh(p, q, y). The budget
set Bh(p, q, y) collects all feasible consumption plans xh and portfolios of
shares θh that satisfy, at given prices (p, q) and production plans y, her
state-dependent budget constraints:
pξ · xhξ +
∑
j∈J
qjξθ
hj
ξ ≤ pξ · whξ +
∑
j∈J
qjξθ
hj
ξ− +
∑
j∈J
θhjξ (pξ · yjξ) for all ξ ∈ Ξ−,
pξ · xhξ ≤ pξ · whξ +
∑
j∈J
θhj
ξ−(pξ · yjξ) for all ξ ∈ ΞT .
(2.1)
Formally, (x˜h, θ˜h) solves the problem:
Max (xh,θh)
{
uh(xh) s.t. (xh, θh) ∈ Bh(p˜, q˜, y˜)
}
for given spot prices p˜, stock prices q˜ and production plans y˜.
We assume that for each consumer h, the individual characteristics
(uh, wh, θh) satisfy the following properties: uh is (A.1) continuously dif-
ferentiable, (A.2) quasi-concave, (A.3) weakly monotone and (A.4) strictly
monotone in good l = 1 in every date-event ξ; and (A.5) wh ∈ RLΞ++ and∑
h∈H θ
hj
ξ−0
= 1, ∀j ∈ J .
The consumer’s decision problem is a standard mathematical program-
ming problem. Assumptions (A.1), (A.2) ensure a first order characteriza-
tion by the Kuhn-Tucker (KT) conditions since (x˜h, θ˜h) is a regular point for
the budget constraints. This will give rise to h’s shadow prices λ˜h = (λ˜hξ )ξ
for resources across date-events (Lagrange multipliers associated to the con-
straints), measured in term of “utils”. Assumption (A.4) delivers positive
λ’s. This helps towards getting some basic ideas across without too many
technical complications.
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Lemma 2.1 summarizes this result, by stating the first-order necessary
and sufficient conditions for optimality of the solutions of the consumer h
decision problem. For notational convenience, for any two arbitrary vectors
p ∈ RLΞ and λ ∈ RΞ, we define the vector λh uunionsq p as a matrix whose Ξ rows
are λξpξ = (λξp`ξ)`∈L ∈ RL.
Lemma 2.1 Assume that (A.1), (A.2) and (A.3) hold. Then, (x˜h, θ˜h) ∈
RΞ+ × RJΞ
−
+ is optimal for the decision problem of consumer h and λ˜
h ∈
RΞ+ \ {0} (respectively, λ˜h ∈ RΞ++ if Assumption (A.4) holds) are Lagrange
multipliers for the inequality constraints if and only if the Kuhn-Tucker con-
ditions stated below hold:
the consumer h budget inequalities (2.1) are binding at (x˜h, θ˜h) (2.2)
λ˜h uunionsq p = ∇uh(x˜h) (the gradient of uh at x˜h); (2.3)
for all (j, ξ) ∈ J × Ξ− \ ΞT−1,
λ˜hξ
(
qjξ − pξ · yjξ
)
−
∑
ξ′∈ξ+
λ˜hξ′q
j
ξ′ ≥ 0 (2.4a)
0 = θ˜hjξ
λ˜hξ (qjξ − pξ · yjξ)− ∑
ξ′∈ξ+
λ˜hξ′q
j
ξ′
 ; (2.4b)
and for all (j, ξ) ∈ J × ΞT−1,
λ˜hξ
(
qjξ − pξ · yjξ
)
−
∑
ξ′∈ξ+
λ˜hξ′pξ′ · yjξ′ ≥ 0 (2.5a)
0 = θ˜hjξ
λ˜hξ (qjξ − pξ · yjξ)− ∑
ξ′∈ξ+
λ˜hξ′pξ′ · yjξ′
 ; (2.5b)
The proof uses standard techniques, and we omit it.
2.2 Firms
Each firm j ∈ J is assumed to have a production set Yj ⊆ RLΞ that satisfies
standard assumptions: Yj is (B.1) convex, (B.2) closed, (B.3) satisfies free
disposal: −RLΞ+ ⊂ Yj ; moreover, (B.4)
(∑
h∈Hw
h +
∑
j∈J Yj
) ∩ RLΞ+ is
compact.
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The production plan of firm j is chosen by the initial shareholders at
date t = 0; that is, we assume that the shareholders’ meeting takes place
before they trade on the stock market at t = 0, yet with full knowledge
of the prices q0. When contemplating a change in the production plan of
the firm, shareholders take as given their consumption and portfolio plans
as well as the production plans of all other firms, but they anticipate the
effect of the contemplated production change on future dividends and on
the current and future prices of firm j’s stock. As explained in section 1.5,
we assume that each consumer h calculates the direct impact of a change
in dividends by using her own vector of marginal utilities for revenue across
date-events, λh ∈ RΞ++. To predict the effect on the stock price, she uses
a (possibly different) state price process αh ∈ RΞ++, which we call h’s price
theory. The only restriction that we impose on consumers’ price theories
is that they should be compatible with the observed equilibrium: given the
equilibrium prices and production plans, the processes αhj must satisfy a
no-arbitrage condition for each firm j, that we now define.
Given spot prices and production plans, (p, y), the stock prices q satisfy
no-arbitrage, written q ∈ N(p, y), if and only if there exists α ∈ RΞ++ such
that, for all j ∈ J ,
αξq
j
ξ =
∑
ξ′≥ξ
αξ′pξ′ · yjξ′ for all ξ ∈ Ξ− with, for any ξ ∈ ΞT , qjξ = 0. (2.6)
For given (p, q, y), let Ω(p, q, y) be the set of processes α ∈ RΞ++ satisfying
2.6. In the definition of equilibrium (see next section) we will require that
the price theories of all agents belong to the set Ω(p, q, y), calculated at
equilibrium values of (p, q, y).
Following Dre`ze (1974) we define a criterion for the firm by postulating
that the chosen production plan must be efficient from the point of view
of the initial shareholders. The production plan chosen by firm j at date
zero must be such that there do not exist an alternative production plan
and transfers of initial resources among the shareholders making all of them
better off. Starting from a given production plan yj there must not exists a
feasible change dyj such that the induced change in utilities satisfies14:∑
h∈Hj
ξ−0
duh
λhξ0
> 0
14The quotients du
h
λh
ξ0
have the dimension of units of account at ξ0; a positive sum entails
the possibility of Pareto domination through transfers of initial resources.
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where Hj
ξ−0
:= {h ∈ H : θhj
ξ−0
> 0} is the set of initial shareholders of firm
j. In our multi-period setting, the effect on consumers’ utilities of a change
in the production plan is defined with respect to given price theories (αh),
which initial shareholders use to evaluate the impact of the proposed change
on the stock’s price.
Lemma 2.2 Given portfolios, consumer state prices, consumer price the-
ories and commodity prices (θ˜, λ˜, α˜, p˜ ), a production plan y˜j is efficient
from the point of view of firm j’s initial shareholders if
y˜j solves Max yj
{
V j(βj(θ˜, λ˜, α˜); p˜, yj) s.t. yj ∈ Yj
}
where for all yj ∈ Yj,
V j(βj(θ˜, λ˜, α˜); p˜, yj) =
∑
ξ∈Ξ
βjξ(θ˜, λ˜, α˜)
(
p˜ξ · yjξ
)
and for all ξ ∈ Ξ
βjξ(θ˜, λ˜, α˜) :=
∑
h∈H
ξ−0
βhjξ (θ˜, λ˜, α˜) (2.7)
with βhjξ (θ˜, λ˜, α˜) :=
λ˜hξ
λ˜hξ0
θ˜hj
ξ− +
∑
ξ′<ξ
λ˜hξ′
λ˜hξ0
(
θ˜hj
ξ′− − θ˜
hj
ξ′
) α˜hξ
α˜hξ′
.
Proof: Starting from given portfolios, consumer state prices, consumer
price theories, commodity prices and a production plan for firm j, (θ˜, λ˜, α˜,
p˜, y˜j ), consider the effect of a marginal change of production at node ξ,
dy˜jξ , on the utility of individual h ∈ Hjξ−0 . To simplify notation we omit the
tildes. Using the individual budget constraint and first order conditions we
obtain:
duh
λhξ0
=
λhξ
λhξ0
θhjξ (pξdy
j
ξ) +
∑
ξ′≤ξ
λhξ′
λhξ0
(
θhj
ξ′− − θ
hj
ξ′
)
dqjξ′ .
To evaluate the price effect, the consumer uses her own price theory αh:
dqjξ′ =
αhξ
αh
ξ′
(pξdy
j
ξ) for all ξ
′ ≤ ξ. Using this expression and rearranging terms
we obtain:
duh
λhξ0
= [
λhξ
λhξ0
θhj
ξ− +
∑
ξ′<ξ
λhξ′
λhξ0
(
θhj
ξ′− − θ
hj
ξ′
) αhξ
αhξ′
](pξdy
j
ξ) = β
hj
ξ (pξdy
j
ξ).
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Thus the coefficient βhjξ in the Lemma is exactly consumer h’s marginal
valuation, at the proposed allocation, of an additional unit of firm j’s profit
at node ξ. Initial shareholders’ efficiency can thus be expressed by saying
that there should not exist a change of production plan dyj such that:∑
h∈H
ξ−0
duh
λhξ0
=
∑
ξ∈Ξ
∑
h∈H
ξ−0
βhjξ (pξdy
j
ξ) =
∑
ξ∈Ξ
βjξ(pξdy
j
ξ) > 0.
This will be the case if the firm uses the criterion V j . 
We can interpret the firm’s criterion as follows. Each shareholder com-
municates to the firm her marginal valuation of profits at all date events
(expressed in terms of initial resources). In defining her own marginal val-
uation of firm j’s profits, a shareholder h evaluates profits at date-event ξ
using her own shadow price for resources at ξ, multiplied by the shares held
at that node, θjhξ . To evaluate the impact of profits at ξ on the market value
of j at every node ξ′ ≤ ξ, h uses her price theory αh, and applies the result
to her trade at ξ′ – thus with a positive sign in case of a sale, and a negative
price in case of a purchase; the resulting impact is multiplied by h’s shadow
prices for resources at ξ′, the date-event where the trade occurs.
The two terms are then added, and this sum defines h’s marginal valu-
ation of firm j’s profits at date-event ξ, βhjξ .
Firm j then computes its own vector of shadow prices for profits at
all date-events, βj , by simply adding up the marginal valuations of all its
initial shareholders. There is no weighting involved, because shareholdings
have been taken into account by the shareholders themselves in computing
their own marginal valuations.
If consumers did not consider the effect of a change in profits on market
value, dqjξ′ = 0 for all ξ
′ ≤ ξ, the effect of dyjξ on a consumer utility would
simply be du
h
λhξ0
=
λhξ
λhξ0
θhjξ (pξdy
j
ξ), leading to:
βjξ =
∑
H
ξ−0
λhξ
λhξ0
θhjξ ,
where, as in the original Dre`ze criterion, a shareholder’s weight at a given
node is her equilibrium asset holding at that node 15.
15BL (2002) obtain a related formula, but with a crucial difference: on the right-hand-
side the summation is over all h, not just over intial shareholders.
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If on the other hand, as in the paper by Grossman and Hart (1979),
each consumer were to evaluate the effect on market value using her vector
of shadow prices for resources, i.e. if for all h αh = λh, all terms in βj
involving changes in portfolios would drop out and we would obtain the
Grossman-Hart criterion:
βjξ =
∑
H
ξ−0
λhξ
λhξ0
θhj
ξ−0
. (2.8)
3 Competitive stock market equilibrium
The above data define the economy:
E =
(
(Xh, uh, wh, (θhjξ0 )j∈J )h∈H, (Y
j)j∈J
)
.
A competitive stock market equilibrium consists of spot prices p˜, stock
prices (q˜j)j , consumer price theories (α˜h)h, consumer state prices (λ˜h)h, con-
sumption plans (x˜h)h, portfolio plans of ownership shares (θ˜h)h, production
plans (y˜j)j , such that,
(1) for each ξ ∈ Ξ− and j ∈ J : ∑h∈H θ˜hjξ = 1;
(2) for each ξ ∈ Ξ: ∑h∈H(x˜hξ − whξ ) =∑j∈J y˜jξ ;
(3) for each h ∈ H, α˜h ∈ Ω(p˜, q˜, y˜);
(4) for each h ∈ H:
(x˜h, θ˜h) solves Max (xh,θh)
{
uh(xh) s.t. (xh, θh) ∈ Bh(p˜, q˜, y˜)}, and λ˜h
λ˜h0
is the vector of marginal rates of substitution between revenue at all
date-events and at ξ0;
(5) for each j ∈ J :
y˜j solves Max yj
{
V j(βj(θ˜, λ˜, α˜); p˜, yj) s.t. yj ∈ Yj
}
where:
(5a) for all yj ∈ Yj , V j(βj(θ˜, λ˜, α˜); p˜, yj) =∑ξ∈Ξ βjξ(θ˜, λ˜, α˜)(p˜ξ · yjξ);
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(5b) for all ξ ∈ Ξ,
βjξ(θ˜, λ˜, α˜) :=
∑
h∈H
ξ−0
βhjξ (θ˜, λ˜, α˜)
with βhjξ (θ˜, λ˜, α˜) :=
λ˜hξ
λ˜hξ0
θ˜hj
ξ− +
∑
ξ′<ξ
λ˜hξ′
λ˜hξ0
(
θ˜hj
ξ′− − θ˜
hj
ξ′
) α˜hξ
α˜hξ′
Conditions (1) and (2) are market clearing equations. Condition (4) and
(5) are the consumers’ and firms’ optimization conditions. Finally, condition
(3) expresses the no-arbitrage restriction on consumer price theories.
4 Existence
To prove the existence of a competitive equilibrium we introduce an auxiliary
concept, which we call pseudo equilibrium. A pseudo-equilibrium differs
from an equilibrium mainly because, at a pseudo-equilibrium, we allow for
the possible free disposal of shares when the price of a firm is zero.
At a pseudo equilibrium, consumers are aware of the possibility of free
disposal of shares, they fully anticipate its occurrence, and revise their
marginal valuation of an additional unit of revenue in a given state ac-
cordingly.
The concept is not meant to have any descriptive appeal. We will use it
only in an intermediate step.
The second aspect in which the definition of a pseudo-equilibrium differs
from that of an equilibrium is a weakening of the no - arbitrage restriction
on price theories.
Let 0 < b < 1Ξ and ∆
b
Ξ−1 := {αh ∈ RΞ+ |
∑
ξ∈Ξ α
h
ξ = 1, αξ ≥ b ∀ξ ∈ Ξ}.
For given spot prices and production plans, (p, y) we say that q ∈ Nb(p, y),
if and only if there exists α ∈ ∆bΞ−1 such that, for all j ∈ J ,
αξq
j
ξ =
∑
ξ′≥ξ
αξ′pξ′ · yjξ′ for all ξ ∈ Ξ− with, for any ξ ∈ ΞT , qjξ = 0. (4.1)
For every consumer h, we then define an upper hemi-continuous corre-
spondence
Ahb : RLΞ+ × RJΞ+ ×
⊗
j
Yj → ∆bΞ−1
which associates price theories αh ∈ Ω(p, q, y) ∩ ∆bΞ−1 to any (p, q, y) such
that q ∈ Nb(p, y).
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The bigger the value of b the smaller the set Nb(p, y), and the smaller
the set of (p, q, y) on which the prices theories defined by Ahb are required to
satisfy the no-arbitrage restriction (4.1).
A b-Pseudo-Equilibrium of a competitive stock market consists of spot
prices p˜, stock prices (q˜j)j , consumer price theories (α˜h)h, consumer state
prices (λ˜h)h, consumption plans (x˜h)h, portfolio plans of ownership shares
(θ˜h)h, production plans (y˜j)j , and anticipated “re-scaling factors” (τ˜ j)j such
that,
(1) for each ξ ∈ Ξ− and j ∈ J : q˜jξ(
∑
h∈H θ˜
hj
ξ −
∑
h∈H θ˜
hj
ξ−) = 0 and
(
∑
h∈H θ˜
hj
ξ −
∑
h∈H θ˜
hj
ξ−) ≤ 0;
(2) for each ξ ∈ Ξ−: ∑h∈H(x˜hξ −whξ ) =∑j∈J (∑h∈H θ˜hjξ )y˜jξ ; and for each
ξ ∈ ΞT :
∑
h∈H(x˜
h
ξ − whξ ) =
∑
j∈J (
∑
h∈H θ˜
hj
ξ−)y˜
j
ξ ;
(3) for each h ∈ H, α˜h ∈ Ahb (p˜, q˜, y˜);
(4) for each h ∈ H:
(x˜h, θ˜h) solves Max (xh,θh)
{
uh(xh) s.t. (xh, ah) ∈ Bh(p˜, q˜, y˜)}, and λ˜h
λ˜h0
is the vector of marginal rates of substitution between revenue at all
date-events and at ξ0;
(5) for each j ∈ J :
y˜j solves Max yj
{
V j(βj(θ˜, λ˜, α˜, τ˜); p˜, yj) s.t. yj ∈ Yj
}
where:
(5a) for all yj ∈ Yj ,
V j(βj(θ˜, λ˜, α˜, τ˜); p˜, yj) =
∑
ξ∈Ξ β
j
ξ(θ˜, λ˜, α˜, τ˜)(p˜ξ · yjξ);
(5b) for all ξ ∈ Ξ,
βjξ(θ˜, λ˜, α˜, τ˜) :=
∑
h∈H
ξ−0
βhjξ (θ˜, λ˜, α˜, τ˜) (4.2)
with βhjξ (θ˜, λ˜, α˜, τ˜) :=
λ˜hξ
λ˜hξ0
τ˜ j
ξ− θ˜
hj
ξ− +
∑
ξ′<ξ
λ˜hξ′
λ˜hξ0
(
τ˜ j
ξ′− θ˜
hj
ξ′− − τ˜
j
ξ′ θ˜
hj
ξ′
) α˜hξ
α˜hξ′
(6) for each j ∈ J and ξ ∈ Ξ−:
τ˜ jξ =
1∑
h θ˜
j
ξ
.
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Condition (1) says that excess supply of shares might be possible at
some date-events if the price is zero. The consequences on the commodity
markets are expressed in condition (2): production is scaled down by a
factor
∑
h θ˜
hj
ξ ≤
∑
h θ˜
hj
ξ− ≤ 1. Condition (3) expresses the weakened no-
arbitrage restriction on consumer price theories. Conditions (4) and (5)
are the consumers’ and firms’ optimization conditions. In the definition of
the objective of the firm we have taken into account that free disposal of
shares may alter the actual share of a firm held by a consumer at the pseudo
equilibrium, namely τ˜ jξ θ˜
hj
ξ . Finally, condition (6) defines the rescaling factors
τ jξ in terms of the actual number of shares held by consumers at each node.
This section will be divided in three parts. In Part I we show that, for
any 0 < b < 1Ξ , a b-pseudo equilibrium exists for an economy compactified
by imposing some artificial bounds. In Part II we show that, starting from
a b-pseudo-equilibrium, if q˜ ∈ Nb(p˜, y˜), we can construct an equilibrium for
the compactified economy. Finally, in Part III we show that the artificial
bounds can be removed.
Part I.
We first introduce some notation. Let projN (K) be the orthogonal pro-
jection of the subset K ⊂ Rn on the subset N ⊂ Rm, where n and m are
non-null integers. Such a mapping is continuous on its domain. Thus the
image of any compact subset of its domain is a compact subset as well. En-
dow the n dimensional Euclidean space Rn with the l1-norm: for a generic
vector x := (xd)nd=1 ∈ Rn, ‖x‖ =
∑n
d=1 |xd|.
We normalize prices as follows. Let
Q :=
{
(p, q) ∈ RLΞ+ × RJ (Ξ
−)
+
∣∣∣∣ ‖pξ‖+ ‖qξ‖ = 1 ∀ξ ∈ Ξ−,‖pξ‖ = 1 ∀ξ ∈ ΞT ,
}
,
be the space of the spot and stock prices p, q; the usual simplex ∆Ξ−1 :=
{λh ∈ RΞ+ |
∑
ξ∈Ξ λ
h
ξ = 1} be the space of all λh, for each h ∈ H; and
∆bΞ−1 := {αh ∈ RΞ+ |
∑
ξ∈Ξ α
h
ξ = 1 and b ≤ αhξ∀ξ ∈ Ξ} be the space of the
price theories for each h ∈ H.
Next, we impose some artificial bounds on choice spaces.
Define
F :=
(x, y) ∈ (RLΞ)H × (⊗
j∈J
Yj) |
∑
h∈H
(xh − wh)−
∑
j∈J
yj ≤ 0

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as the set of feasible actions for commodities. Then, according to Assump-
tion (B.4), there exists a positive real number m¯, such that, for any m ≥ m¯,
Xhm := RLΞ+ ∩M ⊂ projRLΞ+ F for all h ∈ H, and Y
j
m := Yj ∩M ⊂ projYjF
for all j ∈ J , where M defines the n-dimensional hyper-cube [−m,m]n with
n := (ΞH + ΞJ).
We impose an artificial lower bound on portfolios bhj(²) := ²θhj
ξ−0
to avoid∑
h θ
hj
ξ = 0 at any ξ. In Lemma (4.1) we will show that for anym big enough
we can always choose ²(m) small enough that Bh(p, q, y) 6= ∅ on the rele-
vant domain. Let Θhm = ([b
hj(²(m)),m]J )Ξ− denote the set of constrained
portfolios.
Lemma 4.1 Let µ=min {wh`ξ | ` ∈ L, h ∈ H and ξ ∈ Ξ} and
Jm > µ. If ²(m) = ( µJm)
T+1, then for any arbitrary (p, q) ∈
Q and y ∈⊗j∈J Yjm, consumer h’s budget set is non - empty,
i.e. Bh(p, q, y) 6= ∅.
Now, having bounded portfolio holdings away from zero and from above,
we can limit the range of the scaling factors τ jξ =
1P
h θ
hj
ξ
(ξ ∈ Ξ−) to a
compact set T ⊂ RΞ−+ .
Call the truncated economy Em.
Proposition 4.1 Let 0 < b < 1Ξ . Assume (A.1)− (A.5) and (B.1)− (B.4).
Then there exists a b-pseudo-equilibrium for Em.
Proof of Proposition 4.1: The pseudo-equilibrium existence proof paral-
lels that in Radner (1972). We provide a sketch, divided in two main steps.
The proofs of some intermediary lemmas are collected in Appendix A.
Step 1: Defining the fixed point correspondence.
Let Z = Q×⊗H∆bΞ−1×⊗H∆Ξ−1×⊗h∈HXhm×⊗h∈HΘhm×⊗j∈J Yjm×⊗
J T and z = (p, q, α, λ, x, θ, y, τ). The pseudo-equilibria correspondence
is defined as
G : Z ⇒ Z (4.3)
z 7→ ((Ch(z))h, (Pj(z))j ,M(z), (Ah(z))h), (Λh(z))h, (T j(z))j)
where Ahb : Q×
⊗
j∈J Y
j
m → ∆bΞ−1 is the upper hemi-continuous correspon-
dence describing h’s price theory, T j : ⊗h∈HΘh → T is the continuous
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function defining firm j’s scaling factors, as in point (6) of the definition
of pseudo-equilibrium; and the correspondences {(Ch)h, (Pj)j ,M, (Λh)h}
are respectively, consumers’ compensated demand correspondences, firms’
choice correspondences, and the market auctioneer’s correspondences, that
we define as follows.
For any h ∈ H,
Ch : Z ⇒ Xhm ×Θhm (4.4)
z 7→

(xh, θh) ∈ Xhm ×Θhm | λh ·Gh(p, q, y, xh, θh) ≤ 0;
uh(x) ≥ uh(xh)for all (x, θ) ∈ Xhm ×Θhm
s.t. λh ·Gh(p, q, y, x, θ) < 0

whereGh is the column vector whose Ξ elements are (pξ ·(xhξ−whξ )−
∑
j(θ
hj
ξ−−
θhjξ )q
j
ξ −
∑
j θ
hj
ξ (pξ · yjξ)) for the first Ξ− components and (pξ · (xhξ − whξ ) −∑
j θ
hj
ξ−(pξ · yjξ)) for the ΞT terminal ones.
For any j ∈ J , let βj the mapping defined from⊗h∈HΘhm×⊗H∆Ξ−1×⊗
HJ ∆
b
Ξ−1 ×
⊗
j Tj to RΞ by
βj
ξ0
(θ, λ, α, τ) =
∏
h
λhξ0 and
βj
ξ
(θ, λ, α, τ) =
∑
h∈Hj
ξ−0
(
λhξ τ
j
ξ−θ
hj
ξ− +
∑
ξ′<ξ
λhξ′
(
τ j
ξ′−θ
hj
ξ′− − τ
j
ξ′θ
hj
ξ′
) αhξ
αhξ′
) ∏
h′ 6=h
λh
′
ξ0
Define the set Sjm = βj(
⊗
h∈HΘ
h
m ×
⊗
H∆Ξ−1 ×
⊗
H∆
b
Ξ−1 ×
⊗
J T).
Then, let V j be the real valued mapping defined on Sjm × projRLΞ+ (Q) ×Y
j
m
by V j(βj ; p, yj) =
∑
ξ∈Ξ β
j
ξ
(θ, λ, α, τ)(pξ · yjξ).
Then, for any j ∈ J ,
Pj : Z ⇒ Yjm (4.5)
z 7→ Argmax{V j(βj(θ, λ, α, τ); p, yj) | yj ∈ Yjm} .
Let
M : Z ⇒ Q (4.6)
z 7→ M(z)
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where
M(z) :=
(p, q) ∈ Q
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∀(p′, q′) ∈ Q,
(pξ − p′ξ) ·
(∑
h∈H(x
h
ξ − whξ )−
∑
j∈J (
∑
h∈H θ
hj
ξ )y
j
ξ)
)
+
+
∑
j∈J (q
j
ξ − q′ξj)
(∑
h∈H θ
hj
ξ −
∑
h∈H θ
hj
ξ−
) ≥ 0, ξ ∈ Ξ−;
(pξ − p′ξ) · (
∑
h∈H(x
h
ξ − whξ )−
∑
j∈J (
∑
h∈H θ
hj
ξ−)y
j
ξ
) ≥ 0, ξ ∈ ΞT

Finally, for any h ∈ H, let
Λh : Z ⇒ ∆Ξ−1 (4.7)
z 7→ Argmax
{
λh ·Gh(p, q, x, θ, y) | λh ∈ ∆Ξ−1
}
.
The correspondence G embodies all equilibrium correspondences for con-
sumers, producers, and the auctioneer, respectively. The set Z is compact
and convex by construction and Assumptions (B.1) and (B.2). The set S is
compact as well. We need to show that the correspondence G satisfies the
hypotheses of Kakutani’s Fixed-Point Theorem, so that a fixed point z˜m (we
omit the subscript m from variables, unless specified otherwise) exists.
Lemma 4.2 The compensated demand correspondences (Ch)h, the supply
correspondences (Pj)j and the auctioneer’s correspondences M and (Λh)h
are non empty and convex valued, and upper hemi-continuous.
Lemma 4.3 For mbig enough, the pseudo-equilibrium correspondence G is
non empty and convex valued, and upper hemi-continuous.
By Kakutani’s Fixed-Point Theorem, there exists a fixed point z˜m :=
(p˜, q˜, α˜, λ˜, x˜, a˜, y˜, τ˜) ∈ Z.
Step 2: The fixed point z˜m is a pseudo-equilibrium for the truncated
economy Em.
Lemma 4.4 For all ξ ∈ Ξ−,∑
h∈H
θ˜hjξ −
∑
h∈H
θ˜hj
ξ− ≤ 0 and
∑
h∈H
(x˜hξ − whξ )−
∑
j∈J
∑
h∈H
θ˜hjξ y˜
j
ξ ≤ 0.
For all ξ ∈ ΞT , ∑
h∈H
(x˜hξ − whξ )−
∑
j∈J
∑
h∈H
θ˜hj
ξ− y˜
j
ξ ≤ 0.
26
Because of Lemma 4.4, we can assume that m is big enough so that the
consumption of each consumer at the pseudo-equilibrium is in the interior
of the the hyper-cube M = [−m,m]ΞH+ΞJ .
Lemma 4.5 For all h ∈ H,
(x˜h, θ˜h) solves Max (xh,θh){uh(xh) s.t. (xh, θh) ∈ Bh(p˜, q˜, y˜)∩[Xhm× Θhm]},
and the components of λ˜h ∈ RΞ++ are the Lagrange multipliers of the above
maximization problem.
Lemma 4.6 For all j ∈ J ,
y˜j solves Max yj
{
V j(βj(θ˜, λ˜, α˜, τ˜); p˜, yj) s.t. yj ∈ Yjm
}
where for all
yj ∈ Yjm, V j(βj(θ˜, λ˜, α˜, τ˜); p˜, yj) =
∑
ξ∈Ξ β
j
ξ(θ˜, λ˜, α˜, τ˜)(p˜ξ · yjξ), and for all
ξ ∈ Ξ
βjξ(θ˜, λ˜, α˜, τ˜) :=
∑
h∈H
ξ−0
βhjξ (θ˜, λ˜, α˜, τ˜)
with βhjξ (θ˜, λ˜, α˜, τ˜) :=
λ˜hξ
λ˜hξ0
τ˜ j
ξ− θ˜
hj
ξ− +
∑
ξ′<ξ
λ˜hξ′
λ˜hξ0
(
τ˜ j
ξ′− θ˜
hj
ξ′− − τ˜
j
ξ′ θ˜
hj
ξ′
) α˜hξ
α˜hξ′
.
Lemma 4.7 For all h ∈ H,
p˜ξ · x˜hξ +
∑
j∈J
q˜jξ θ˜
hj
ξ = p˜ξ · whξ +
∑
j∈J
q˜jξ θ˜
hj
ξ− +
∑
j∈J
θ˜hjξ (p˜ξ · y˜jξ) for all ξ ∈ Ξ−,
p˜ξ · x˜hξ = p˜ξ · whξ +
∑
j∈J
θ˜hj
ξ−(p˜ξ · y˜jξ) for all ξ ∈ ΞT .
Lemma 4.8 For all ξ ∈ Ξ−,∑
h∈H
(x˜hξ − whξ )−
∑
j∈J
∑
h∈H
θ˜hjξ y˜
j
ξ = 0
and for all j ∈ J , q˜jξ
(∑
h∈H
θ˜hjξ −
∑
h∈H
θ˜hj
ξ−
)
= 0. (4.8)
For all ξ ∈ ΞT , ∑
h∈H
(x˜hξ − whξ )−
∑
j∈J
∑
h∈H
θ˜hj
ξ− y˜
j
ξ = 0.
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This ends the proof of Proposition 4.1.
Part II.
To prove the existence of an equilibrium, we use the following additional
assumption, which, as in Grossman and Hart (1979) (cfr. our discussion in
section 1.4), says that production can be stopped at any moment:
(B.5) At an arbitrary date-event ξ ∈ Ξ, and for any feasible
production plan yj ∈ Yj , there exists another feasible pro-
duction plan zj ∈ Yj with zj(ξ′) = 0 for all ξ′ ∈ Ξ+[ξ] and
zj(ξ′) = yj(ξ′) otherwise.
Proposition 4.2 Assume (A.1)− (A.5) and (B.1)− (B.5). If for some b,
at a b-pseudo-equilibrium, q˜ ∈ Nb(p˜, y˜), then there exists an equilibrium for
Em.
Proof of Proposition 4.2: We start with the following Lemma showing
that, at a pseudo-equilibrium, if q˜ ∈ Nb(p˜, y˜), the stream of future dividends
at any given node, evaluated using β˜, does not exceed the observed price of
the firm at that node.
Lemma 4.9 At a pseudo equilibrium, for all j and all ξ,
β˜jξ q˜
j
ξ ≥
∑
ξ′≥ξ
β˜jξ′(p˜ξ′ · y˜ξ′)
Proof of Lemma 4.9: To simplify notation, consider the case of a
single initial owner, and omit the indexes h and j, and the tildes. We also
use the notation λ¯ξ =
λξ
λξ0
. At any given ξ:
∑
ξ′∈ξ+
βξ′qξ′ =
∑
ξ′∈ξ+
(
λ¯ξ′τξθξ +
∑
ξ0≤ξ”≤ξ
λ¯ξ”(τξ”−θξ”− − τξ”θξ”)
αξ′
αξ”
)
qξ′ .
We can rewrite the term on the right as:
τξθξ
∑
ξ′∈ξ+
λ¯ξ′qξ′ +
( ∑
ξ0≤ξ”<ξ
λ¯ξ”(τξ”−θξ”− − τξ”θξ”)
αξ
αξ”
)( ∑
ξ′∈ξ+
αξ′
αξ
qξ′
)
+λ¯ξ(τξ−θξ− − τξθξ)
∑
ξ′∈ξ+
αξ′
αξ
qξ′ .
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Using the KT conditions of the decision problems of consumers (2.4)-(2.5),
and the no-arbitrage condition for α (2.6), we obtain:∑
ξ′∈ξ+
βξ′qξ′ ≤
(
λ¯ξτξθξ +
∑
ξ0≤ξ”<ξ
λ¯ξ”(τξ”−θξ”− − τξ”θξ”)
αξ
αξ”
+λ¯ξ(τξ−θξ− − τξθξ)
)
(qξ − pξ · yξ)
that is: ∑
ξ′∈ξ+
βξ′qξ′ ≤ βξ (qξ − pξ · yξ) .
A simple recursion argument using the fact that at the terminal nodes stock
prices are null concludes the proof. 
We now argue that if at a pseudo-equilibrium q˜ ∈ Nb(p˜, y˜) and for some
firm j and some node ξ, q˜jξ = 0 and
∑
h θ
jh
ξ <
∑
h θ
jh
ξ− , we can always re-
scale the production plan, the shareholdings and the price and obtain a full
equilibrium.
Consider a pseudo equilibrium (p˜, q˜, α˜, λ˜, x˜, θ˜, y˜, τ˜) with q˜jξ = 0 for some
firm j and some node ξ.
First notice that: ∑
ξ′≥ξ
β˜jξ′(p˜ξ′ · y˜jξ′) = 0. (4.9)
Indeed, from Lemma 4.9,
∑
ξ′≥ξ β˜
j
ξ′(p˜ξ′ · y˜jξ′) ≤ 0. Using (B.5) we can con-
clude that the inequality is in fact an equality because otherwise the firm
would have done better by stopping activity at node ξ.
We now re-scale production plans, portfolios and prices as follows: θˆjhξ =
τ˜ jξ θ˜
jh
ξ , yˆ
j
ξ =
1
τ˜jξ
y˜jξ , qˆ
j
ξ =
1
τ˜jξ
q˜jξ .
Clearly,
∑
h θˆ
jh
ξ = 1 for all ξ, and we may set τˆξ = 1 for all ξ. Then, for
all j and all ξ, βjξ(θ˜, λ˜, α˜, τ˜) = β
j
ξ(θˆ, λ˜, α˜, τˆ) = βˆ
j
ξ (see eq. (4.2)).
The rescaled portfolios are feasible: ²θhj
ξ−0
≤ θˆhjξ0 ≤ 1 for all ξ ∈ Ξ−.
Indeed, the right side inequality is easely obtained, since by the positivity of
all θ˜hjξ we have θ˜
hj
ξ ≤
∑
h θ˜
hj
ξ = 1/τ˜
j
ξ for all ξ ∈ Ξ−. The left side inequality
is obtained proceeding as follows. Considering the first relation in Lemma
4.4, we obtain
∑
h θ˜
hj
ξ ≤
∑
h θ˜
hj
ξ0
= 1 for all ξ ∈ Ξ−, that is 1 ≤ τ˜ jξ for all
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ξ ∈ Ξ−. Then, if in addition we use the feasibility of the optimal portfolios
θ˜hjξ with ²θ
hj
ξ−0
≥ 0, we get ²θhj
ξ−0
≤ ²θ˜hj
ξ−0
τ jξ ≤ θ˜hjξ τ jξ = θˆhjξ for all ξ ∈ Ξ−.
The re-scaling does not affect the individual budget, nor the consumers’
first order conditions (cfr. (2.1), keeping in mind that q˜jξ = 0 whenever
τ˜ξ > τ˜ξ− ).
Finally, we must show that the rescaled production plan yˆj is feasible
and optimal for firm j at the (unchanged) state prices βˆj = β˜j .
Proceeding backwards, let t1 be the largest t such that for some ξ1 ∈ Ξ1
and some j we have τ˜ jξ1 > τ˜
j
ξ−1
. Then q˜jξ1 = 0 and, by (4.9),∑
ξ′≥ξ1
β˜jξ′(p˜ξ′ · y˜jξ′) = 0. (4.10)
For every such ξ1, proceed as follows. Re-scale y˜j in the sub-tree starting at
ξ1 by a factor (τ˜
j
ξ−1
)/(τ˜ jξ1) < 1. By assumption (B.5) the re-scaled production
plan is feasible. Moreover, by equation ((4.10)), its value at state prices
βˆj = β˜j is zero. That is, the rescaled plan is maximizing firm j profit at the
given state prices in the sub-tree starting at ξ1.
Proceed backwards and repeat the foregoing operation as many times as
needed if there exists another date t2 at which for some ξ2 ∈ Ξ2 and some j
we have τ˜ jξ2 > τ˜
j
ξ−2
.
Notice that these successive re-scalings generate exactly the production
plan yˆj . Thus, we conclude that this re-scaled plan belongs to the efficient
boundary of the production set Y j at the (unchanged) state prices used by
the firm.
To summarize, we have shown that: for the truncated economy Em, a
quasi-equilibrium z˜m = (p˜, q˜, α˜, λ˜, x˜, θ˜, y˜, τ˜) with q˜ ∈ Nb(p˜, y˜) leads to an
equilibrium zˆm = (p˜, qˆ, α˜, λ˜, x˜, θˆ, yˆ) after re-scaling.
Part III.
Proposition 4.3 Assume (A.1)− (A.5) and (B.1)− (B.5). If for some b,
at a b-pseudo-equilibrium, q˜ ∈ Nb(p˜, y˜), then there exists an equilibrium for
E.
Assumption (B.4) ensures that for m big enough at the equilibrium
of the truncated economy, zˆm, all endogenous variables defining other than
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ownership shares are in the interior of the hyper-cubeM ; moreover
∑
h θˆ
hj =
1 for all j and all ξ, so that the the upper bound on ownership shares is
also not binding. By Assumptions (A.2) and (A.4), (x˜h, θˆh) is a solution of
consumer h unconstrained decision problem. Using Assumption (B.1) and
the convexity of the objective function V j of firm j on Yj , yˆj is a solution
of firm j unconstrained decision problem.
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Appendix: Proofs of Lemmas
Proof of Lemma 4.1
We prove the result by defining an ² and a portfolio such that constraints
(2.1) are satisfied for an arbitrary event ξ that may occur at time t. Since
the stock market does not exist in terminal date-events, let for any j ∈ J
and any ξ ∈ ΞT , qjξ = 0 and θhjξ = θhjξ−∀h ∈ H.
Let 0 < η < 1 and, for an arbitrary event ξ ∈ Ξ that may occur at time
t (0 ≤ t ≤ T ), let θhξ = ηt+1θhξ0− .
At this portfolio, the income of consumer h at ξ is
∑
j∈J
ηt(1− η)θhj
ξ0
−q
j
ξ +
∑
`∈L
p`ξ
wh`ξ +∑
j∈J
ηt+1θhj
ξ0
−y
j
`ξ
 .
The first term is positive since 0 < ηt+1 < 1, while the second term is
positive for all η such that 0 < η ≤ µJm < 1, where µ = min{wh`ξ : ` ∈ L, h ∈
H, ξ ∈ Ξ} and m big enough so that µJm < 1.
Indeed, each of the terms inside the parentheses is bounded below by
µ − Jmηt+1 because −m ≤ yj`ξ ≤ 0 for all (`, j) ∈ L × J , θhjξ−0 ≥ 0 for all
j ∈ J and ∑j∈J θhjξ−0 = 1. If ηt+1 ≤ wh`ξJm for all ` ∈ L at date-event (t, ξ),
the lower bound is positive.
Feasibility of θh is guaranteed by taking ² = ηT+1, since 0 < η < 1.
Proof of Lemma 4.4
We consider only the initial date-event ξ0, since clearly from that same
reasoning one can get the result for every subsequent date-event ξ ∈ Ξ.
Combining the definition ofM with aggregation over all consumers (h ∈ H)
of their budget constraints in (2.1) shows that,
for all (pξ0 , qξ0) ∈ projRL+×RJ+ (Q),
pξ0 ·
∑
h∈H
x˜hξ0 − whξ0 −∑
j∈J
θ˜hjξ0 y˜
j
ξ0
+∑
j∈J
qjξ0
(∑
h∈H
θ˜hjξ0 −
∑
h∈H
θ˜hj
ξ−0
)
≤
p˜ξ0 ·
∑
h∈H
x˜hξ0 − whξ0 −∑
j∈J
θ˜hjξ0 y˜
j
ξ0
+∑
j∈J
q˜jξ0
(∑
h∈H
θ˜hjξ0 −
∑
h∈H
θ˜hj
ξ−0
)
≤ 0,
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From the continuity of the orthogonal projection mapping, we know that
proj⊥RL+×RJ+
(Q) is a compact set since Q is compact as well. So, it follows
that∑
h∈H
(x˜hξ0 − whξ0)−
∑
j∈J
(∑
h∈H
θ˜hjξ0
)
y˜jξ0
 ,(∑
h∈H
θ˜hξ0 −
∑
h∈H
θ˜h
ξ−0
)
belongs to (proj⊥RL+×RJ+
(Q))◦ i.e. to the negative polar cone of proj⊥RL+×RJ+
(Q),
that is the set of vectors x ∈ RL+J such that the natural scalar product
between x and all vectors of proj⊥RL+×RJ+
(Q) is less or equal to 0. Then, the
results hold.
Proof of Lemma 4.2
We shall proceed in three parts.
Part 1: We first prove that the compensated demand correspondence
Ch is non empty valued. Fix (p, q, λh, y), let Bh(p, q, λh, y) = {(xh, θh) ∈
Xhm ×Θhm | λh ·Gh(p, q, y, x, θ) ≤ 0} and consider the problem
Max {uh(xh) | (xh, θh) ∈ Bh(p, q, λh, y)}.
This problem has a solution thanks to the continuity of uh and the com-
pactness and non-emptiness of the budget (Lemma (4.1). The solution is an
element of Ch(p, q, λh, y).
To prove the upper hemi-continuity of Ch, let (pn, qn, λhn, yn)n ∈
⊗
n[Q×
∆Ξ−1×
⊗
j∈J Y
j
m] be a sequence that converges to (p, q, λ, y) and let (xhn, θ
h
n)n ∈⊗
n[Xhm × Θhm] be a sequence that converges to (xh, θh), with (xhn, θhn) ∈
Ch(pn, qn, λhn, yn) for all n. We need to show that (xh, θh) ∈ Ch(p, q, λh, y).
For all n, λhn ·Gh(pn, qn, yn, xhn, θhn) ≤ 0, and the inequality is preserved at
the limit. To prove the second condition in the definition of Ch(p, q, λh, y),
suppose there exists (x¯h, θ¯h) ∈ Xhm × Θhm such that uh(x¯h) > uh(xh).
Then, by continuity of uh, (A.1), uh(x¯h) > uh(xhn) for n big enough. But
then, using the fact that (xhn, θ
h
n) ∈ Ch(pn, qn, λhn, yn), it must be that λhn ·
Gh(pn, qn, yn, x¯h, θ¯h) ≥ 0, and, going to the limit, λh ·Gh(p, q, y, x¯h, θ¯h) ≥ 0,
i.e. the second condition in the definition of Ch(p, q, λh, y) is verified and we
can conclude that (xh, θh) ∈ Ch(p, q, λh, y).
To show the convexity of the values of the compensated demand corre-
spondence Ch, let (xh, x′h) ∈⊗2 Ch(z) where z ∈ Z and let µ ∈ [0, 1]. By the
definition of Ch, there exists (θh, θ′h) ∈⊗2Θhm so that ((x, θ), (x′h, θ′h)) ∈
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⊗
2 B
h(y, p, q, λh). Then, let xµh be µxh+ (1−µ)x′h and θµh be µθh+ (1−
µ)θ′h. Clearly (xµh, θµh) belongs to Bh(p, q, λh, y). Consequently, if xµh 6∈
Ch(z), then there exists x′′h ∈ Xhm and θ′′h ∈ Θhm such that, u(x′′h) > u(xµh)
together with λh · G(p, q, λh, x′′h, θ′′h, y) ≤ 0. From Assumption (A.2) and
u(x′′h) > u(xhµ), we easily deduce that either u(x′′
h) > u(xh) or u(x′′h) >
u(x′h). Considering that fact, together with λh ·G(p, q, λh, x′′h, θ′′h, y) ≤ 0,
we contradict (xh, x′h) ∈⊗2 Ch(z).
Part 2: (i) Clearly βj are well defined and continuous on their respec-
tive domains, since T j is continuous too. Then, Sjm is compact since its is
the image of the product of compact subsets. Clearly V j is continuous, since
it results from the composition of continuous maps. Therefore, the maxi-
mum of V j(βj(θ, λ, α, τ); p, yj) over the non empty compact convex subset
Yjm exists for any given (θ, λ, α, p) in the domain of V j . This guarantees the
non emptiness of the values of the correspondence Pj . (ii)The compactness
of the values of Pj can be easily proved since Yjm is compact too (by As-
sumption (B.2) and by construction). (iii) The convexity of the values of
Pj follows from Assumption (B.1) and the definition of Pj . (iv) Finally,
showing that the graph of Pj is a closed subset is sufficient for the upper
hemi-continuity of Pj since the correspondence takes its values in a compact
subset. Let (zn)n = (pn, qn, αn, λn, xn, θn, yn, τn)n ∈
⊗
n Z be a sequence of
elements that converges to z = (p, q, α, λ, x, θ, y, τ) and yjn ∈ Pj(zn) for all
n. Recall that Z results from the cartesian product of a family of com-
pacts, hence closed subsets. So, each limit point belongs to each relative
set. Using the continuity of βj and V j on their domains, then one obtain
by passing to the limit that: for all y′j ∈ Yjm, V j(βj(θ, λ, α, τ) p, yj) ≥
V j(βj(θ, λ, α, τ) p, y′j) which means that yj ∈ Pj(z). Hence, the graph of
Pj is closed.
Part 3: It is easy to see that the correspondence M is non empty
compact valued and upper hemi-continuous. The non emptiness of the val-
ues of Λh is ensured by the fact that we are maximizing a continuous function
over a compact set. The proof of the convexity and the compactness of the
values of the correspondence Λh is routine. The upper-hemi continuity of
Λh is obtained by proving that its graph is closed.
Proof of Lemma 4.3
By Lemma 4.2 and the continuity of the function T j for each j ∈ J , it
follows that the correspondence G is non-empty and convex valued as well
35
as upper hemi-continous.
Given Lemma 4.4, we can assume that m is big enough so that the
consumption of each consumer at the pseudo-equilibrium is in the interior
of the the hyper-cube M = [−m,m]ΞH+ΞJ . We use this property from now
on.
Proof of Lemma 4.5
The proof follows from the definition of Ch and Λh once we notice that at
the fixed point the compensated and uncompensated demand coincide. By
the monotonicity of uh (A.4), when m is big enough so that x˜h is in the
interior of the compact set Xhm, than we must have λ˜h >> 0. Using this,
and the assumption of strictly positive endowments (A.5), we see that the
budget defined by λ˜hGh(p˜, q˜, y˜, x˜h, θ˜h)) ≤ 0 has an interior point at the fixed
point, and the compensated and non compensated demand coincide.
Proof of Lemma 4.6
The proof follows from the definition of Pj by noticing that βj
ξ
= Πhλhξ0β
j
ξ
for all ξ ∈ Ξ, and Πhλ˜hξ0 > 0 by (A.4) .
Proof of Lemma 4.7
Suppose to the contrary that there exists at least a date-event ξ ∈ Ξ and a
consumer h ∈ H such that
p˜ξ · x˜hξ +
∑
j∈J
q˜jξ θ˜
hj
ξ < p˜ξ · whξ +
∑
j∈J
q˜jξ θ˜
hj
ξ− +
∑
j∈J
θ˜hjξ (p˜ξ · y˜jξ).
(with q˜jξ = 0 and θ˜
hj
ξ = θ˜
hj
ξ− if ξ ∈ ΞT ).
By monotonicity of uh, (A.4), we could find a consumption plan uh(xh) >
uh(x˜h) such that λ˜hGh(p˜, q˜, y˜, xh, θ˜h)) ≤ 0, a contradiction with the conclu-
sion of Lemma 4.5.
Proof of Lemma 4.8
Aggregating over all consumers (h ∈ H) the binding budget constraints
(thanks to Lemma 4.7) and considering Lemma 4.4 and the non-negativity
of the prices p˜ and q˜, one can check easily that, for all ξ ∈ Ξ−,
q˜jξ
(∑
h∈H
θ˜hjξ −
∑
h∈H
θ˜hjξ−
)
= 0, j ∈ J and pξ ·
(∑
h∈H
(x˜hξ − whξ )−
∑
j∈J
∑
h∈H
θ˜hjξ y˜
j
ξ
)
= 0,
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together with, for all ξ ∈ ΞT ,
pξ ·
(∑
h∈H
(x˜hξ − whξ )−
∑
j∈J
∑
h∈H
θ˜hj
ξ− y˜
j
ξ
)
= 0.
Therefore, by free-disposal (B.3), we obtain equalities in the market clearing
conditions for commodities.
